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ENDURING DOCTRINE:  
THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN  
WISCONSIN INJURY LAW 
When the common law collateral source rule first arose in the area of 
tort law over one hundred years ago, only a minority of individuals 
maintained health insurance coverage to protect against loss in the event 
that a negligent actor injured them.  Today, however, the vast majority of 
Americans are covered.  Because of this change in the landscape of 
insurance coverage, many jurisdictions have abrogated or greatly eroded 
the collateral source rule under the belief that the rule no longer holds a 
justified role in personal injury litigation.  Wisconsin, however, continues 
to follow the common law form of the rule and recently rejected legislation 
that would have effectively abrogated it.  Wisconsin is not alone; many 
jurisdictions still adhere to the common law collateral source rule, and find 
support from many voices in the legal community. This support is 
grounded in the belief that the rationales that have long said to justify the 
rule still maintain their significance.  This Comment agrees with them and 
argues that, while the collateral source rule may have its shortcomings, the 
many justifications for the common law form of the rule remain crucially 
valid today and are significantly overlooked by the suggested alternatives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The collateral source rule has long been a fixture in Wisconsin law.1  
The rule dictates that “if an injured party receives compensation for [his 
or her] injuries from a source independent of the tortfeasor, the payment 
should not be deducted from the damages that the tortfeasor must pay.”2  
Opponents of the rule have long called for its reform and even its 
abrogation—calls that have only grown louder since the passage of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act at the federal level in 2010.3  
Efforts were recently made in the Wisconsin legislature to abrogate the 
rule in personal injury litigation, and while the bill failed, proponents of 
the change have vowed to renew these efforts in the next legislative 
session.4  This Comment opposes such proposals in the immediate future, 
advocating instead for the continued adherence to the common law form 
of the collateral source rule in Wisconsin. 
For a better understanding of the collateral source rule, consider the 
following hypothetical.  Imagine you are involved in an automobile 
accident, with two different scenarios arising in the aftermath.  In scenario 
#1, you are a negligent driver who caused the accident.  The other driver, 
who was of no fault at all, sustained injuries that amount to $100,000 in 
medical expenses.  Because the injured driver had health insurance 
coverage, his or her insurer paid $60,000 of the medical expenses as part 
of a negotiated rate of coverage.  Still seeking full compensation from you 
(the negligent driver), the injured driver sues in search of a money 
judgment for the full $100,000 in medical bills accrued over the course of 
his or her injury.  At trial, the injured driver introduces evidence of the 
$100,000 in medical expenses.  You wish to introduce evidence that 
$60,000 of the plaintiff’s bills were already paid by the plaintiff’s insurer.  
The court, however, refuses to admit the evidence, and the jury returns a 
judgment against you for $100,000 in damages.  You, the defendant, are 
upset because in your mind the plaintiff only needed a $40,000 judgment 
to be made whole again.  Providing the plaintiff with an additional $60,000 
 
1.  Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 26, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1. 
2.  Collateral-Source Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
3.  See infra Part VI.B. 
4.  See infra Part V.C. 
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in damages amounts to a double recovery, of sorts, in which the plaintiff 
is getting a large sum of money that is entirely undeserved. 
In scenario #2, you are now the injured driver in the car accident, 
incurring a loss of $100,000 in medical expenses due to the negligence of 
another driver.  You had the foresight to purchase health insurance, for 
which you have paid years’ worth of premiums in order to have the best 
coverage available in the market.  As a result of possessing this coverage, 
your insurer pays $60,000 towards your $100,000 in medical bills.  Still 
seeking full compensation for your damages, you file suit against the 
negligent driver.  At trial, you offer into evidence the medical bills making 
up the $100,000, but the court also allows the defendant to admit into 
evidence how much of those bills were paid by your insurer.  The jury, 
after noting that you would only need an additional $40,000 to pay the 
balance of your medical bills, awards you a judgment of only $40,000.  
You are upset because you believe it should be of no concern to the 
injured driver nor the jury what arrangements you had the good sense to 
make ahead of time to have the payment of your medical bills aided by a 
third party.  In many ways, you believe you are actually being punished 
for your efforts since without this insurance you would have received at 
least the additional $60,000.  As a policyholder, you paid years’ worth of 
premiums in order to be covered, the total of which reaches well into the 
thousands of dollars.  And now that you actually use this coverage, you 
are not seeing all of the benefits that you originally believed you 
contracted for when purchasing the policy. 
The two scenarios outlined above represent the dichotomy that exists 
under the collateral source rule.  Scenario #1 portrays the rule in action 
in a jurisdiction that follows the traditional, common law form of the rule.  
Scenario #2 portrays a jurisdiction that has abrogated the rule completely.  
The modern trend, as part of the broader tort reform movement of the 
last several decades, is to move away from the collateral source rule5—a 
rule that has existed in the United States since the beginning of the 
nineteenth century—and follow the latter scenario.6  Wisconsin has 
consistently adhered to the rule for roughly one hundred years,7 but the 
 
5.  See discussion infra Part V.B. 
6.  See discussion infra Part II; see also Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The 
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. REV. 741, 741 (1964). 
7.  See discussion infra Part III. 
 212 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:209 
recent proposal of legislation seeking to abrogate the rule has cast a 
brighter light on the topic in the state than in previous years.8   
The collateral source rule is one of crucial significance to tort law,9 
specifically in the personal injury context because it relates directly to 
each and every individual in society—all of whom are potential plaintiffs, 
defendants, and jurors in a civil lawsuit for damages.  This Comment 
argues that Wisconsin should continue its strong adherence to the 
traditional, common law form of the rule, despite calls for reform.  
Notwithstanding the rule’s shortcomings and the changing landscapes of 
both tort law and the insurance market,10 the primary justifications and 
rationales of the collateral source rule remain incredibly viable and 
continue to outweigh alternatives seen elsewhere. 
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of what the collateral 
source rule is, its origin in American tort law, and the different forces that 
have influenced the rule’s development in state legislatures.  Part III 
provides a history of Wisconsin’s treatment of the rule and hopes to 
provide a thorough update on where the state’s case law currently rests, 
specifically as the rule pertains to personal injury litigation.  Part IV 
examines the core rationales and justifications that helped lead to the 
creation of the rule, as well as its maintenance.  This part also alludes to 
the fact that these rationales seek to contribute to the greater goals of tort 
law. 
Part V dives into the primary criticisms of the collateral source rule 
and modern reforms.  Part V also examines the two most commonly 
found alternatives to the traditional rule and points out their deficiencies.  
This part also explores the recently proposed, yet failed, legislation in 
Wisconsin that sought to abrogate the collateral source rule and the 
special interests influencing and fueling that proposal. 
Part VI argues that the criticisms of the rule, its alternatives, and the 
proposed reforms in Wisconsin greatly overlook the rationales that 
underlie the collateral source rule.  This part concludes that the 
alternatives to the rule do little to undermine those rationales and, due to 
the buoyancy of those rationales, the collateral source rule must maintain 
its current form in Wisconsin law.  Part VI also explores what effect, if 
any, recent federal healthcare reform may have on the value of the rule 
and purports that, once again, any effect that healthcare reform would 
 
8.  See discussion infra Part V.C. 
9.  See discussion infra Part IV. 
10.  See infra notes 140, 145. 
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have on the collateral source rule would ultimately fail to erode its total 
value. 
This Comment, as a whole, does not aim to provide a truly exhaustive 
exploration and analysis of the collateral source rule across the country 
but instead aims more narrowly to examine the current state of the rule 
in Wisconsin, and to help determine what value remains of it for the state.  
The Comment ultimately concludes that the collateral source rule 
continues to possess immense value for the State of Wisconsin and should 
be maintained in its traditional, common law form amid falling into the 
crosshairs of special interest groups proposing reform. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
For more than a century, courts throughout the United States have 
applied the collateral source rule to affect the amount of money a plaintiff 
may receive in a tort action.11  The rule dictates that a plaintiff’s recovery 
against a defendant-tortfeasor may not be reduced by any payments or 
benefits conferred by sources other than the defendant.12  If a plaintiff 
receives compensation for injuries from a third party, the defendant will 
nonetheless be liable to the plaintiff for the total cost of the plaintiff’s 
medical care.13  “In other words, the tortfeasor is not given credit for 
payments or benefits conferred upon the injured person by any person 
other than the tortfeasor or someone identified with the tortfeasor (such 
as the tortfeasor’s insurance company).”14 
 
11.  See Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in the Face of 
Tort Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 965, 
969 (2012); Larry D. Warren & Nathan L. Mechler, Paid or Incurred and the Collateral Source 
Rule Across the Country, 59 FED’N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 203, 206 (2009); Unreason in the 
Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, supra note 6, at 741. 
12.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b, c (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  These 
payments may be from sources such as insurance policies, employment benefits, gratuities, and 
social legislation benefits.  Id. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 26, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1.  Generally, 
however, where an agreement exists between the plaintiff and their third party collateral source 
for subrogation, the collateral source rule does not apply.  See Ann S. Levin, Comment, The 
Fate of the Collateral Source Rule After Healthcare Reform, 60 UCLA L. REV. 736, 747–48 
(2013).  Subrogation occurs when an insurance company seeks reimbursement from a 
tortfeasor for medical expenses that it paid on behalf of its insured, the plaintiff.  Id.  “Where 
subrogation is allowed, the insurance company can either seek reimbursement from a 
tortfeasor directly or assert a right to part of an award that the plaintiff recovers from a 
tortfeasor.”  Id.  It is the contract agreed upon prior to the accident between the insurer and its 
insured that provides this right of subrogation to the insurer.  Id. 
 214 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:209 
The collateral source rule is “considered to serve both as a rule of 
evidence and as a rule of damages.”15  As a rule of evidence, it bars the 
admission of evidence that the plaintiff received benefits from a collateral 
source as compensation for any part of the loss.16  As a rule of damages, 
a jury is prevented from subtracting from a money judgment any amount 
repaid to the plaintiff already from an outside source.17  Accordingly, the 
traditional form of the rule has prevented the subtraction of benefits 
“received through health insurance, federal medical programs, worker’s 
compensation payments, welfare benefits, and even gratuitous benefits” 
from a plaintiff’s damage award.18 
In an action for personal injuries, the injured plaintiff may seek 
damages for the reasonable value of medical care provided.19  As part of 
the traditional collateral source rule, the “reasonable value” is the 
amount billed for the plaintiff’s medical services and not the lesser 
amount ultimately paid by the plaintiff’s health insurance company at a 
reduced rate.20  Issues arise today,21 however, due to the now-common 
practice of medical providers negotiating with health insurance 
companies to provide care to insured individuals at a rate lower than the 
billed charge.22  As exemplified in the introduction to this Comment, an 
insured plaintiff’s medical bills may amount to $100,000, yet his or her 
insurer only pays $60,000 to the medical care provider due to a negotiated 
rate.23  The plaintiff may still recover damages for the billed $100,000, 
rather than the $60,000 actually paid by his or her insurer.  This extra 
$40,000 is often referred to as phantom damages since no one ever paid 
the medical expenses, or is even obligated to, yet the plaintiff receives the 
full price billed by the medical provider.24 
A. Special Interest Influence on the Collateral Source Rule 
Those most affected by the collateral source rule have played the 
 
15.  Warren & Mechler, supra note 11, at 206. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 15, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 611 N.W.2d 764. 
20.  Levin, supra note 14, at 744–45. 
21.  An example would be phantom damages. 
22.  Levin, supra note 14, at 744–45.  
23.  See supra Part I. 
24.  See Andrew C. Cook, Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules Plaintiffs Entitled to Receive 
“Phantom Damages,” FEDERALIST SOC’Y: STATE CT. DOCKET WATCH, Spring 2012, at 1. 
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greatest role in shaping its reform or, in turn, maintaining it in its common 
law form.  The lobbying efforts of groups representing lawyers, doctors, 
insurers, businesses, and others have been largely behind any changes to 
the rule in the recent decades, often as a segment of the broader tort 
reform effort seen in the last half-century.25 
The original common law rule with no modification benefits both 
plaintiffs and their attorneys because it makes the size of tort awards 
larger than in the absence of the rule and, in turn, a larger attorney’s share 
under their respective percentage of an award.26  Defense attorneys may 
benefit as well because they are likely, for instance, to have substantially 
more billable hours when the potential award to the plaintiff is higher.27  
The primary lobbying group representing plaintiff attorneys is the 
American Association for Justice,28 whose stated mission is, in part, “to 
support the work of attorneys in their efforts to ensure that any person 
who is injured by the misconduct or negligence of others can obtain 
justice in America’s courtrooms, even when taking on the most powerful 
interests.”29  Such a position speaks to attorneys seeking the largest 
recovery possible for plaintiffs under the traditional, plaintiff-friendly 
form of the rule, as opposed to the “powerful interests” further discussed 
below who seek to protect likely defendants from such suits.  
One of the powerful interests on the other side of the fight are the 
insurers of defendants, who benefit from a modified collateral source rule 
that precludes recovery under certain circumstances because such 
modifications could greatly reduce the size of awards to plaintiffs, 
lowering the amount the insurers could be liable for on behalf of the 
defendant insured.30  A primary lobbying organization representing 
insurers is the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies 
(NAMIC),31 whose stated goal is the advocacy of insurers’ interests on 
key legislative and regulatory initiatives.32  The NAMIC’s official position 
 
25.  See generally David Schap & Andrew Feeley, The Collateral Source Rule: Statutory 
Reform and Special Interests, 28 CATO J. 83, 92–94 (2008). 
26.  Id. at 92. 
27.  Id. 
28.  See Mission & History, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., https://www.justice.org/who-we-
are/mission-history [http://perma.cc/ZN3X-6RCN] (last visited Dec. 22, 2014) (previously 
known as the Association of Trial Lawyers of America). 
29.  Id. (emphasis added). 
30.  Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 92. 
31.  See NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES, http://www.namic.org/pac/default.asp 
[http://perma.cc/KNV7-KSX2] (last visited Aug. 21, 2015). 
32.  NAMIC Vision & Mission, NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES, 
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on collateral source reforms states that it “supports allowing collateral 
source payments at trial or offsetting the amount paid to plaintiffs by 
collateral sources, less the amount paid by the plaintiff to secure the 
benefit.”33  Meaning, the group supports an erosion, and even abrogation, 
of the rule. 
Additionally, corporations and the business community as a whole, to 
the extent that they purchase insurance that protects them in cases of tort 
lawsuits brought against them, benefit from erosions to the collateral 
source rule as well.34  If insured, a reduction to the rule would likely lower 
insurance premiums for these groups as a response to market forces 
because plaintiffs’ judgments paid by defendants’ insurers would be 
reduced.35  And of course, if the business is uninsured, any judgments 
against it in favor of injured plaintiffs would be reduced by any amount 
paid by a collateral source on the plaintiff’s behalf.36  Medical care 
providers, like the business community, also benefit from erosions to the 
rule in that tort awards against them would be lessened, such as doctors, 
who are particularly at risk of becoming defendants in a malpractice suit.37  
The major organization lobbying on behalf of doctors is the American 
Medical Association,38 which calls for federal tort reform in the area of 
the collateral source rule by accounting for the “mandatory offset of 
collateral sources of plaintiff compensation” in medical liability.39  Both 
of these groups—medical care providers and the general business 
community—benefit from an eroded collateral source rule as potential 
defendants and as insurance premium payers. 
Ultimately, the push from these many different sources of influence 
for tort reform and the erosion of the collateral source rule culminated in 
 
http://www.namic.org/aboutnamic/visionMission.asp [http://perma.cc/TH7G-BVPS] (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2014). 
33.  Collateral Source Reforms, NAT’L ASS’N MUTUAL INS. COMPANIES, 
http://www.namic.org/issues/collateralSource.asp [http://perma.cc/D6YA-J2K9] (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2014). 
34.  Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 93. 
35.  See id. 
36.  See id. 
37.  Id.  In Wisconsin, these medical groups have been successful.  See WIS. STAT. 
§ 893.55(7) (2013–2014). 
38.  Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 96. 
39.  H-435.978 Federal Medical Liability Reform, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-
assn.org/ssl3/ecomm/PolicyFinderForm.pl?site=www.ama-assn.org&uri=/resources/html/ 
PolicyFinder/policyfiles/HnE/H-435.978.HTM [https://perma.cc/B2BW-VGRC] (last visited 
Dec. 22, 2014). 
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1986 with the creation of the American Tort Reform Association 
(ATRA).40  ATRA’s mission statement brazenly states that it is an 
organization set out to fix a justice system that, to paraphrase, has been 
compromised by aggressive personal injury lawyers who systematically 
recruit clients to target certain defendants as profit centers for massive 
suits.41  ATRA’s official position on the collateral source rule—an area in 
which the organization devotes significant focus and effort—is to permit 
“the admissibility of evidence of collateral source payments at trial or 
requiring awards to be offset by the amount paid to plaintiffs by collateral 
sources, less the amount paid by the plaintiff to secure the benefit.”42  
Meaning, the group supports the erosion and even abrogation of the rule. 
III.  THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN WISCONSIN 
“The collateral source rule is a well-established rule of law in 
Wisconsin.”43  The state has long recognized it,44 and the Supreme Court 
 
40.  See Schap & Feeley, supra note 25, at 96. 
41.  Mission, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/about/mission 
[http://perma.cc/N2PR-Z8S5] (last visited December 22, 2014).  The relevant portions of the 
ATRA’s mission statement in full reads: 
Today, America's $246 billion civil justice system is the most expensive in the 
industrialized world.  Aggressive personal injury lawyers target certain professions, 
industries, and individual companies as profit centers.  They systematically recruit 
clients who may never have suffered a real illness or injury and use scare tactics, 
combined with the promise of awards, to bring these people into massive class action 
suits.  They effectively tap the media to rally sentiment for multi-million-dollar 
punitive damage awards.  This leads many companies to settle questionable lawsuits 
just to stay out of court.  These lawsuits are bad for business; they are also bad for 
society.  They compromise access to affordable health care, punish consumers by 
raising the cost of goods and services, chill innovation, and undermine the notion of 
personal responsibility.  The personal injury lawyers who benefit from the status quo 
use their fees to perpetuate the cycle of lawsuit abuse.  They have reinvested millions 
of dollars into the political process and in more litigation that acts as a drag on our 
economy.  Some have compared the political and judicial influence of the personal 
injury bar to a fourth branch of government. 
Id. 
42.  Collateral Source Rule Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/collateral-source-rule-reform [http://perma.cc/9FGM-YX76] (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2014). 
43.  Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 26, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1 (citing 
Thoreson v. Milwaukee Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972); Merz v. 
Old Republic Ins. Co., 53 Wis. 2d 47, 191 N.W.2d 876 (1971); McLaughlin v. Chi., Milwaukee, 
St. Paul & Pac. Ry. Co., 31 Wis. 2d 378, 143 N.W.2d 32 (1966)). 
44.  Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 39, 116 N.W. 633, 634 
(1908). 
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of Wisconsin formally adopted it in 1921 in Cunnien v. Superior Iron 
Works Co.45  Since then, the court has confirmed its application of the 
traditional form of the collateral source rule,46 with Leitinger v. DBart, 
Inc. serving today as the state’s clearest endorsement of the rule.47  In 
Leitinger, the plaintiff sued for damages from a personal injury, and at 
trial the parties argued over the reasonable value of the plaintiff’s medical 
services.48  “The health care provider billed [the plaintiff] $154,818.51 for 
the treatment rendered, but as a result of negotiated discounts” between 
the provider and insurer, “the health care provider accepted $111,394.73 
from [the plaintiff’s] health insurance company.”49  
At the circuit court level, “the jury was presented only with evidence 
of the amount actually paid for the medical treatment rendered,” ignoring 
the collateral source rule.50  The jury awarded the plaintiff $111,394.73 for 
his medical expenses—the exact amount that was paid by his insurer.51  
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, 
concluding that “the fact finder should not be allowed to consider 
‘payments made by outside sources on the plaintiff’s behalf, including 
insurance payments.’”52  
The question presented to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on review 
was “whether, in light of the collateral source rule, evidence of the 
amount actually paid by a plaintiff’s health insurance company for the 
plaintiff’s medical treatment is admissible in a personal injury action for 
the purpose of establishing the reasonable value of the medical treatment 
rendered.”53  The court ultimately held such evidence inadmissible, being 
prohibited by the collateral source rule.54  
Then-Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson, speaking for a 5–2 majority 
of the court, began her analysis by summarizing the collateral source rule 
as “help[ing] claimants recover the ‘reasonable value of the medical 
 
45.  175 Wis. 172, 187, 184 N.W. 767, 772 (1921). 
46.  Bryce Benjet, A Review of State Law Modifying the Collateral Source Rule: Seeking 
Greater Fairness in Economic Damages Awards, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 210, 245 (2009). 
47.  See Leitinger, 2007 WI 84, ¶ 75. 
48.  Id. ¶¶ 2–3. 
49.  Id. ¶ 3. 
50.  Id. ¶ 12. 
51.  Id. ¶ 13. 
52.  Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Leitinger v. Van Buren Mgmt., Inc., 2006 WI App 146, ¶ 17, 295 
Wis. 2d 372, 720 N.W.2d 152). 
53.  Id. ¶ 4. 
54.  Id. ¶ 75. 
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services, without limitation to the amounts paid.’”55  The court held that 
the collateral source rule prohibits parties in a personal injury action from 
introducing evidence of the amount actually paid by the injured person’s 
health insurance company to prove the reasonable value of the medical 
treatment.56  
The court agreed with the plaintiff that two Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin decisions regarding the collateral source rule governed the 
present case: Ellsworth v. Schelbrock57 in 2000 and Koffman v. 
Leichtfuss58 in 2001.59  These cases, the court noted, reaffirmed “the 
vitality of the collateral source rule” in Wisconsin.60  In Ellsworth, the 
court reasoned that Wisconsin’s tort law “applies the collateral source 
rule as part of a policy seeking to ‘deter negligent conduct by placing the 
full cost of the wrongful conduct on the tortfeasor.’”61  In a further 
affirmation of Wisconsin’s adherence to the collateral source rule, the 
court held in Koffman that the rule applied to payments that have been 
reduced by contractual arrangements between insurers and health care 
providers.62  The court reasoned that this “assures that the liability of 
similarly situated defendants is not dependent on the relative fortuity of 
the manner in which each plaintiff’s medical expenses are financed.”63  
Most recently in 2012, the court reaffirmed its adherence to the 
doctrine and expanded its reach in Orlowski v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.64  The plaintiff in Orlowski was injured in an 
automobile accident caused by an underinsured driver and recovered 
damages up to the limits of the underinsured driver’s insurance.65  The 
plaintiff also had health insurance coverage that paid a portion of her 
 
55.  Id. ¶ 27 (alteration in original) (quoting Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth Hosp.-Mayo 
Health Sys., 2005 WI 124, ¶ 56, 285 Wis. 2d 1, 700 N.W.2d 201). 
56.  Id. ¶¶ 28–29. 
57.  2000 WI 63, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 611 N.W.2d 764.  In Ellsworth, the court found that the 
collateral source rule applied to medical assistance benefits; thus, the defendant was not 
allowed to introduce evidence of the amount actually paid.  Instead, the plaintiff could 
introduce the amount that was billed by the medical providers.  Id. ¶ 2. 
58.  2001 WI 111, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201. 
59.  Leitinger, 2007 WI 84, ¶ 35. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Ellsworth, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 7 (quoting Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d 
258, 264, 369 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
62.  Koffman, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 2. 
63.  Id. ¶ 31. 
64.  2012 WI 21, 339 Wis. 2d 1, 810 N.W.2d 775. 
65.  Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 
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medical expenses, as well as an automobile insurance policy that included 
underinsured motorist coverage.66  After an arbitration panel ruled that 
the collateral source rule did not apply to this sort of claim due to a lack 
of precedent on the specific issue and after moving through the lower 
courts,67 the specific issue before the supreme court was whether the 
collateral source rule allows the recovery of written-off medical expenses 
in a claim under an insured’s underinsured motorist coverage.68  The court 
reaffirmed its prior decisions that “an injured party is entitled to recover 
the reasonable value of medical services, which, under the operation of 
the collateral source rule, includes written-off medical expenses.”69  The 
court held that the distinction between insurance policies for negligence 
and underinsured motorist cases did not justify diverging from its 
precedent and constraining the collateral source rule’s application.70  This 
is the farthest the court has extended the rule to date and reflects the 
state’s strong adherence to the rule. 
IV.  RATIONALES OF THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE 
Rationales for the collateral source rule that arose from its natural 
development, as well as many of the goals underlying the broader area of 
tort law, led to the creation of the common law rule and continue to 
support it today.71  There are, of course, legitimate criticisms to the rule,72 
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts admits there is the possibility of a 
double recovery, or any sort of excess damages, to the plaintiff.73  Despite 
criticism,74 many tort law experts have long viewed the potential 
drawbacks of the rule to be undoubtedly outweighed by its goals and 
 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. ¶¶ 8–11.  At the trial court, the arbitration decision was modified to award the 
plaintiff the full value of medical expenses, which included any amounts deducted due to 
payments from collateral sources.  After the defendant appealed, the court of appeals certified 
the case to the supreme court out of concern that the trial court’s decision was in conflict with 
the supreme court’s past precedent.  Id. ¶¶ 10–11. 
68.  Id. ¶¶ 8, 12. 
69.  Id. ¶ 4. 
70.  Id. ¶ 23.  Despite the arbitration panel being reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, I must admit that my father, Attorney Paul F. Poehlmann, served on the panel.  If it 
serves as any consolation to him (which I’m sure it does not), I would have ruled as the 
arbitration panel did. 
71.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 
1977). 
72.  See discussion infra Part V.A. 
73.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
74.  See infra Part V.A. for more on the rule’s criticisms. 
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justifications.75  This Comment will focus on four major rationales of the 
collateral source rule: restoration, unjust enrichment, deterrence, and 
incentive to mitigate. 
A. Restoration of the Plaintiff 
Courts often justify the traditional application of the collateral source 
rule as providing the most precise form of restoration in the plaintiff,76 
meaning the award that will make a plaintiff financially whole again in 
light of the injuries suffered.77  When courts are applying the collateral 
source rule, it follows that “the injured party should be made whole by 
the tortfeasor, not by a combination of compensation from the tortfeasor 
and collateral sources.”78  Meaning, those sources are beyond the concern 
of the tortfeasor.  Additionally, recoverable medical expenses may exist 
beyond that of the amount paid by the collateral source, so “[t]he 
collateral source rule allows the plaintiff to seek recovery for the 
reasonable value of medical services without consideration of payments 
made by the plaintiff’s insurer . . . .”79  If a jury is presented with evidence 
of exactly what the plaintiff requires to pay off any remaining medical 
bills, it will likely award damages of only that amount.80  The damage 
award the plaintiff receives from the defendant is often incomplete, 
especially when future medical costs and attorney fees are taken into 
consideration.81  This reasoning reflects the belief that using the billed 
charges, rather than what was actually paid by the collateral source, best 
measures the need for making the plaintiff whole again. 
B. Unjust Enrichment 
Another rationale for the collateral source rule is the law’s desire to 
prevent unjust enrichment.82  While one may recognize that its operation 
 
75.  Todd, supra note 11, at 977; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. 
b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
76.  Levin, supra note 14, at 756. 
77.  Bozeman v. State, 2003–1016, p. 19 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 704. 
78.  Acuar v. Letourneau, 531 S.E.2d 316, 323 (Va. 2000). 
79.  Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 29, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1 (quoting 
Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 46, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201). 
80.  Such as in Leitinger, 2007 WI 84, for example. 
81.  Todd, supra note 11, at 974; see also id. at 977 (“Critics characterize this justification 
of the rule as misguided because it seeks to remedy the tort system’s shortcomings through the 
oblique and confusing mechanism of the collateral source rule.”). 
82.  See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 437, 485 (2006).  “Unjust enrichment” is defined as “The retention of a 
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has the potential to provide the plaintiff with a double recovery or 
phantom damages,83 advocates of the rule argue that this result is an 
acceptable one given the alternative of the defendants receiving such a 
windfall themselves.84  The Restatement (Second) of Torts argues:  
[I]t is the position of the law that a benefit that is directed to the 
injured party should not be shifted so as to become a windfall for 
the tortfeasor.  If the plaintiff was himself responsible for the 
benefit, as by maintaining his own insurance or by making 
advantageous employment arrangements, the law allows him to 
keep it for himself.85 
When a choice must be made between providing a windfall to the 
plaintiff or to the defendant, the more culpable defendant should not 
receive the benefit of the plaintiff’s foresight.86  Fairness dictates that 
“[t]he collateral source rule ensures that the liability of similarly situated 
defendants is not dependent on the relative fortuity of the manner in 
which each plaintiff’s medical expenses are financed.”87  The purpose of 
the rule “is not to provide the injured person with a windfall, but rather 
to prevent the tortfeasor from escaping liability because a collateral 
source has compensated the injured person.”88  “The injured person, not 
the tortfeasor, benefits from the collateral source.”89 
C. Incentive to Mitigate 
A further justification for the collateral source rule is to provide 
incentive for individuals to mitigate their risks by purchasing insurance.90  
 
benefit conferred by another, who offered no compensation, in circumstances where 
compensation is reasonably expected.”  Unjust Enrichment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). 
83.  Cook, supra note 24, at 1. 
84.  Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis. 2d 726, 733, 512 N.W.2d 749, 752 (1994). 
85.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).  The 
Restatement continues, “If the benefit was a gift to the plaintiff from a third party or established 
for him by law, he should not be deprived of the advantage that it confers.”  Id. (referring to 
gratuitous services or government-funded services). 
86.  Linda J. Gobis, Note, Lambert v. Wrensch: Another Step Toward Abrogation of the 
Collateral Source Rule in Wisconsin, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 857, 862 (1988). 
87.  Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 32, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1. 
88.  Id. ¶ 34. 
89.  Id. 
90.  See Levin, supra note 14, at 753–54 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 920A cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“If the plaintiff was himself responsible for the benefit, 
as by maintaining his own insurance or by making advantageous employment arrangements, 
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Potential increased recovery at trial, as a result of the collateral source 
rule, encourages parties to purchase insurance—something public policy 
greatly desires.91  Some courts believe that “a person who has invested 
years of insurance premiums to assure his medical care should receive the 
benefits of his thrift.”92  This investment is premised on a contractual 
obligation that insurers have to pay, and they have therefore assumed the 
loss as a business risk.93  While the insured plaintiff may not have intended 
to bargain for any sort of windfall in the event of an injury, the benefits 
that they receive as a result of the injury are simply the result of this 
contractual agreement.94  Public policy and the courts have respected this 
agreement and reason that the collateral source rule serves as an 
incentive for all to enter into such agreements.95 
D. Deterrence 
A principal goal of the collateral source rule is to deter the harmful 
behavior of a tortfeasor, as it is the belief of courts that the greater the 
amount of damages levied against a defendant will most discourage that 
defendant from negligently harming others in the future.96  Courts are 
concerned that “reducing the recovery by the monies paid by a third party 
would hamper the deterrent effect of the law.”97  It is asserted that to best 
deter a tortfeasor’s negligent conduct, he or she should be fully 
responsible for the entire amount of damages billed as a result of his or 
her tortious conduct.98 
Although the prevalence of insurance coverage is argued to lessen the 
deterrent impact of damages,99 there continues to be evidence that tort 
 
the law allows him to keep it for himself.”)). 
91.  Gobis, supra note 86, at 862. 
92.  Helfend v. S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61, 66 (Cal. 1970). 
93.  Gobis, supra note 86, at 862. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Todd, supra note 11, at 982.  As Todd points out, some commentators believe this 
rationale of the collateral source rule to be a weak one, generally reasoning that the rule plays 
little to no role in an individual’s decision to obtain insurance.  Id.; see also Joel K. Jacobsen, 
The Collateral Source Rule and the Role of the Jury, 70 OR. L. REV. 523, 533–34 n.46 (1991) 
(calling the rationale “silly”).  Todd goes on to add that the vast majority of scholars and judges 
alike view the rationale as a legitimate basis for the collateral source rule.  Todd, supra note 11, 
at 982. 
96.  Levin, supra note 14, at 750–51. 
97.  Bozeman v. State, 2003-1016, p. 13 (La. 7/2/04); 879 So. 2d 692, 701 (quoting Suhor v. 
Lagasse, 2000-1628 p. 9 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/13/00); 770 So. 2d 422, 427). 
98.  See Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶ 33, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1. 
99.  See infra Part VI.B. (discussing healthcare reform and its effect on the collateral 
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judgments do deter undesirable conduct.100  Advocates of the collateral 
source rule argue that the deterrent goal of the rule lies at the heart of the 
fault basis of tort law and to overlook this goal would encourage 
undesirable conduct.101  It is further argued that if the collateral source 
rule were abrogated, the tort system would be deprived of the 
opportunity to correct the wrongdoer and deter further injurious conduct 
of the individual tortfeasor and others participating in tortious activity.102  
This rationale for the rule lies at the core of tort law and remains an 
indispensable justification regardless of whether a tortfeasor is actually 
aware of the collateral source rule. 
V.  THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IN THE AGE OF TORT REFORM 
The common law collateral source rule originated at a time when 
health insurance and public health benefits did not exist,103 and recent 
changes in the way health care is provided and paid for has led many 
states to review the fairness and necessity of the rule.104  Such review, in 
conjunction with the rule’s general criticisms, has led a number of states 
to modify or abrogate the rule in attempts to account for today’s 
economic realities.105   
A. Criticisms of the Collateral Source Rule 
The collateral source rule’s treatment of damages has been heavily 
criticized for having the potential to create a windfall for plaintiffs.106  This 
is due, in large part, to the fact that because the jury would be unaware of 
any collateral payments, it might award medical damages that are higher 
than the amount the plaintiff or the collateral source actually paid for the 
 
source rule (CSR)). 
100.  L. Timothy Perrin, Comment, The Collateral Source Rule in Texas: Its Impending 
Demise and a Proposed Modification, 18 TEX. TECH L. REV. 961, 989 (1987). 
101.  Id. at 989–90. 
102.  Lawrence P. Wilkins, A Multi-Perspective Critique of Indiana’s Legislative 
Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule, 20 IND. L. REV. 399, 402–03 (1987). 
103.  Benjet, supra note 46, at 211. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id.  
106.  See generally Unreason in the Law of Damages: the Collateral Source Rule, supra 
note 6 (constituting one of the earliest calls for reform and erosion of the rule, primarily 
attacking the core rationales of the rule as insufficient); see also Jacobsen, supra note 95, at 523 
(criticizing the rule for neglecting the role of the jury in tort cases in which the collateral source 
rule is invoked). 
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medical care (phantom damages).107  Additionally, opponents argue that 
the rule allows for the possibility that a tortfeasor may pay a judgment 
even though the plaintiff has already been partly or completely 
compensated for the injuries suffered.108  “Thus, double recovery is 
possible[,] and the plaintiff can be put in a better position than before the 
tort occurred.”109  
The potential for excessive damage awards brings about the criticism 
that the collateral source rule conflicts with the compensatory role of tort 
law.110  A primary purpose of tort law is to make plaintiffs whole again 
after an accident occurs or to put plaintiffs in the same condition as before 
an accident.111  “The collateral source rule, however, requires a 
[tortfeasor] to pay even though plaintiffs have already been 
compensated.”112  Recovering under such circumstances is more alike to 
punitive damages, and punitive damages do not compensate but rather 
punish to discourage other similar offenses.113  
A third criticism of the collateral source rule is that it conflicts with 
the damage mitigation principle of tort law.114  The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, in describing mitigation, provides:  
When the defendant’s tortious conduct has caused harm to the 
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special 
benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value 
of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to 
the extent that this is equitable.115 
Under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff may receive a benefit as 
a result of the tortfeasor’s conduct, while not having their judgment 
reduced by this same benefit.116  “Therefore, the rule contravenes the 
 
107.  Levin, supra note 14, at 744. 
108.  Gobis, supra note 86, at 860 (when subrogation rights do not exist for the collateral 
source). 
109.  Id. 
110.  Id. 
111.  See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 2, 7 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
112.  Joseph M. Engl, Comment, Gratuitous Nursing Services Rendered by Extended 
Family Members and Other Third Parties: Can Injured Parties Receive Reimbursement Under 
Wisconsin’s Collateral Source Rule?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 1003, 1008–09 (2002). 
113.  See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, at 9. 
114.  Gobis, supra note 86, at 861. 
115.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977). 
116.  Gobis, supra note 86, at 861. 
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mitigation principle because receipt of benefits from a collateral source 
does not act to mitigate damages.”117 
A majority of the criticism surrounding the rule focuses on the 
damages awarded to plaintiffs but overlooks the effect of the rule on the 
fact finder.118  As previously stated,119 the rule withholds certain 
information relevant to the calculation of the plaintiff’s damages.120  
Withholding information such as the actual amount paid for medical 
expenses diminishes the jury’s traditional role of deciding all contested 
issues of fact, including damages.121  Traditionally, the jury has been 
viewed as having adequate discretion for handling the assessment of 
damages.122  It is argued that “the collateral source rule significantly limits 
the exercise of this discretion by withholding relevant information from 
the jury.”123  Although the jury may overcompensate the victim, it does so 
unwittingly.124 
In Wisconsin, justices of the supreme court have raised much of these 
criticisms in dissent of decisions that either upheld or expanded the reach 
of the rule.  In 2000 and 2001, then-Justice Diane Sykes dissented in two 
cases125 that the correct reward of medical damages is what is truly 
incurred by the plaintiff in the treatment of his or her injuries, “not an 
artificial, higher amount based upon what the plaintiff might have 
incurred if he or she had a different sort of health plan or no health plan 
at all.”126  Less than a decade later, then-Justice Patience Roggensack 
wrote a lengthy dissent in Leitinger v. DBart, arguing that the court 
extended the collateral source rule too far when it ruled that parties are 
prohibited in personal injury actions from introducing evidence of the 
amount actually paid by the person’s health insurer.127  She argued that 
the majority had unnecessarily expanded the evidentiary component of 
 
117.  Id. 
118.  For a more thorough analysis of this criticism, see Jacobsen, supra note 95. 
119.  See supra Part II. 
120.  See Warren & Mechler, supra note 11, at 206. 
121.  See generally Linn v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 1976). 
122.  Vanskike v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 725 F.2d 1146, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984). 
123.  Jacobsen, supra note 95, at 524–25. 
124.  Id. at 525. 
125.  See Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 67, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 630 N.W.2d 201; 
Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 23, 235 Wis. 2d 678, 611 N.W.2d 764. 
126.  Koffman, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 69; see also Ellsworth, 2000 WI 63, ¶ 31. 
127.  Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 2007 WI 84, ¶¶ 77–78, 302 Wis. 2d 110, 736 N.W.2d 1 
(Roggensack, J., dissenting). 
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the collateral source rule, creating a new category of damages and 
usurping the jury’s fact-finding function.128 
B. Alternatives to the Common Law Collateral Source Rule 
Statutes reforming the collateral source rule vary widely,129 but nearly 
all possess the goal of eliminating the potential for excessive recovery by 
the plaintiff.130  Throughout the United States, forty-two jurisdictions 
have enacted some form of legislation that restricts the rule.131  Within 
these jurisdictions, “[e]ven where the rule has been applied generally, 
collateral source damages are often limited in health care liability cases 
as part of broader tort-reform legislation.”132  States that have diverged 
from the common law approach to the rule pay more attention to 
payments by the plaintiff’s health insurer, whether the same insurance 
plan calls for subrogation, and whether the plaintiff paid premiums to 
contract for the benefits he or she received at the time of the injury.133  
The overall result of the divergence from the common law rule across the 
country has, in general, led to two alternative approaches for measuring 
personal injury damages accurately.134 
One option is to subtract from charged medical bills the amount that 
the plaintiff’s insurer has paid (or another collateral source), including 
amounts written off.135  This has the result of abrogating the collateral 
source rule entirely, viewing medical expenses already paid or discounted 
by collateral sources as not constituting harm suffered by the plaintiff, 
and therefore would not be included in any damage calculation used to 
make the plaintiff whole again.136  Florida, for example, has a statute 
under which a court must reduce an award of economic damages by “all 
amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant, or which 
are otherwise available to the claimant, from all collateral sources.”137   
 
128.  Id. 
129.  Benjet, supra note 46, at 211. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Levin, supra note 14, at 756. 
134.  Id. at 757. 
135.  Id.  
136.  Id. 
137.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76(1) (West 2014).  Other states abrogating, or significantly 
eroding, the collateral source rule include: Alabama (ALA. CODE § 12-21-45 (LexisNexis 
2014)) (allowing evidence of medical or hospital expenses that have been or will be paid or 
reimbursed); Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.070 (2014)) (allowing for a post-verdict reduction 
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States that have taken this first approach and effectively abrogated 
the rule reason that payments from a collateral source adequately restore 
a victim to whole.138  Some state supreme courts, however, have actually 
found their state’s statutes completely abrogating the rule in this general 
manner as improper under their state constitutions.139  For example, in 
New Hampshire the state’s attempt at abrogating the rule was held to 
discriminate arbitrarily in favor of health care providers as a class, thereby 
violating equal protection guarantees of the New Hampshire 
Constitution.140  Additionally, a shortcoming to this approach is that it 
completely overlooks the cost and effort exerted by a plaintiff in 
obtaining the collateral source payment.141  If the collateral source was 
something like an insurance provider, for which the plaintiff had to pay 
premiums for a length of time, then a damage award reflecting only the 
medical expenses paid would result in a plaintiff not truly have been made 
whole.  Thus, if insurance premiums were considered necessary to make 
the plaintiff whole, the collateral source rule would compensate a plaintiff 
more adequately than this alternative option. 
A somewhat softer alternative than total abrogation of the collateral 
source rule is to allow damage awards to be reduced by payments made 
by collateral sources but then to offset that reduction by the amount the 
plaintiff paid in something such as insurance premiums.142  While this 
 
by amounts received or to be received from collateral sources that do not have subrogation 
rights); Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-565 (2014)) (abrogating the collateral source 
rule in medical malpractice suits but retaining the common law rule in all other contexts); Idaho 
(IDAHO CODE § 6-1606 (2014)) (prevents double recovery due to collateral source payments 
but only when those collateral sources are not those for which the plaintiff contracted for); 
Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2906(2) (2015)) (abrogating the collateral source rule in 
medical malpractice suits, but retaining the common law rule in all other contexts); Maryland 
(MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-09(d) (West 2014)) (abrogating the collateral 
source rule in medical malpractice suits but retaining the common law rule in all other 
contexts); New York (N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4545 (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)) (partially abolishes 
the collateral source rule); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-06 (2013)) (eliminates 
the collateral source rule only to the extent that it prevents double recovery for payments from 
sources such as Social Security benefits); Texas (TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN § 41.0105 
(West 2014)) (abrogating the collateral source rule). 
138.  See Benjet, supra note 46, at 211. 
139.  See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); see also O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 
892 S.W.2d 571 (Ky. 1995). 
140.  Carson, 424 A.2d at 836. 
141.  Levin, supra note 14, at 758. 
142.  Id.  Other states follow some form of this approach.  See, e.g., Connecticut (CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-225a(a)–(b) (West 2015)) (reducing damages awards by collateral 
source payments if no subrogation exists but offsetting it by the amount of premiums paid as 
of the date the court enters judgment); Indiana (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-44-1-2 (LexisNexis 
 2015] ENDURING DOCTRINE 229 
approach would still abrogate the rule and be unwelcomed by plaintiffs,143 
it would still provide an additional recovery for premium payments and 
shows greater respect for the plaintiff’s efforts in securing insurance 
coverage144—something tort law always seeks to encourage.145   
One problem with this middle-ground approach is how to calculate 
the amount of premium payments a plaintiff should receive as part of his 
or her overall damage award146—a problem responded to inconsistently 
across the states following it.147  Minnesota resolves this issue by 
accounting for the premiums paid in the two years before the lawsuit,148 
while Connecticut calculates the amount the plaintiff paid in premiums 
during the years in which the plaintiff received care related to the 
injury.149  In either alternative to the common law rule, plaintiffs that have 
the foresight to obtain something like insurance coverage are still much 
worse off and defendants better off. 
C.  Proposed Legislation in Wisconsin 
In early 2013, the Wisconsin Assembly and Senate introduced mirror 
bills aimed at reforming the Wisconsin law governing collateral source 
payments in personal injury cases.150  The proposed change would have 
 
2014)) (allowing into evidence proof of collateral source payments, proof of subrogation 
obligations, and proof of the cost of securing the collateral benefits; such consideration is not 
automatic, however, and must be introduced into evidence); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 600.6303 (West 2014)) (reducing damages awards by collateral source payments if no 
subrogation exists but offsetting it by the amount of premiums paid); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 548.251 (West 2015)) (reducing damages awards by collateral sources payments if no 
subrogation exists but offsetting it by amount of premiums paid in the two-year period before 
the lawsuit); Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-308 (2015)) (reducing damages awards over 
$50,000 by collateral source payments if no subrogation exists but offsetting it by the amount 
of premiums paid in the five years preceding the judgment should such evidence be admitted); 
Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (2014)) (reducing damages awards post-judgment by 
collateral source payments if no subrogation exists but offsetting it by the amount of premiums 
paid); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (West 2015)) (reducing damages awards by 
collateral sources payments if no subrogation exists but offsetting it by amount of premiums 
paid during the policy period which the benefits are payable); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2315.20 (LexisNexis 2014)) (reducing damages awards by collateral sources payments if no 
subrogation exists but offsetting it by amount of premiums paid). 
143.  See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 128 (N.D. 1978). 
144.  Levin, supra note 14, at 758. 
145.  See supra notes 25–29. 
146.  Levin, supra note 14, at 759. 
147.  Id. 
148.  MINN. STAT ANN. § 548.251 (West 2015). 
149.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 52–225a(c) (West 2015). 
150.  See Assemb. B. 29, 101st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2013); S.B. 22, 101st Leg. Reg. Sess. 
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allowed the fact finder to consider evidence of collateral source payments 
and evidence of the injured person’s obligations of subrogation or 
reimbursement resulting from those collateral source payments.151  This 
change had the “purpose of rebutting the presumption that billing 
statements and invoices that are patient health care records state the 
reasonable value of the health care services provided to the injured 
person.”152  The legislation failed to advance out of a Senate Joint 
Resolution in April of 2013,153 but similar legislation is likely to reappear 
in 2015–2016 session.154 
According to Wisconsin’s Government Accountability Board, the 
groups that lobbied in support of the legislation to reform the collateral 
source rule, as well as those that opposed it, made the Assembly Bill the 
ninth-most-lobbied bill in the first six months of 2013.155  Some of the 
lobbying groups that acted in support of the legislation included the 
Wisconsin Defense Counsel,156 which advocates on behalf of defendants 
in civil litigation matters,157 as well as the Wisconsin Medical Society,158 a 
group advocating for physicians and medical care providers.159 
A primary opponent of the legislation was the Wisconsin Association 
for Justice, the state’s chapter of the national American Association for 
Justice.160  A press release by the organization released just after the 
 
(Wis. 2013). 
151.  See Assemb. B. 29; S.B. 22. 
152.  S.B. 22 (emphasis added); see also Assemb. B. 29. 
153.  WCJC Legislative Tracking Report 2013–2014, WIS. CIV. JUST. COUNCIL, INC., 
http://www.wisciviljusticecouncil.org/tracking-report/ [http://perma.cc/X7JA-52N9] (last 
updated Mar. 26, 2014). 
154.  See Andrew Cook, Wisconsin Legislative Update, 12 WIS. CIV. TRIAL. J. 6 (2014).  
After personal inquiry, the relevant State Senate and Assembly committees’ report that, as of 
July 1, 2015, no such legislation has been discussed in the current session.  
155.  G.A.B. Releases Detailed Lobbying Report for First Six Months of 2013, GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY BOARD: STATE OF WIS. (Sept. 12, 2013), http://gab.wi.gov/node/2946 
[http://perma.cc/TU3C-7GWL]. 
156.  Cook, supra note 154, at 6.  The WDC was previously known as the Civil Trial 
Counsel of Wisconsin.  Id. 
157.  About the Wisconsin Defense Counsel, WIS. DEF. COUNS., http://www.wdc-
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introduction of the legislation denounced the bill for discriminating 
“against responsible Wisconsinites who have planned ahead and 
purchased health insurance.  By allowing in evidence of amounts paid by 
someone else, people with health insurance could recover less money for 
their medical care than people without insurance.  That is wrong.”161  The 
release went on to conclude that the bill actually “penalizes people who 
have worked hard and bought health insurance,” stressing that “[t]he bill 
rewards bad behavior and encourages premium theft.”162 
Despite the failed legislative effort of 2013, the fight over reforming, 
maintaining, or abrogating the collateral source rule in Wisconsin tort law 
is unlikely to be finished.  There is significant discussion from groups that 
lobbied for the legislation that efforts be renewed beginning in the 2015–
2016 legislative session.163  Those opposed to any erosion of the collateral 
source rule will likely be ready to renew their strong support for the 
common law rule and continue to argue for its preservation.164 
VI.  THE CASE AGAINST REFORMING THE COLLATERAL SOURCE 
RULE IN WISCONSIN 
Wisconsin tort law should refrain from making any significant erosion 
to the collateral source rule as it applies in the personal injury context in 
the immediate future.  The alternatives to the common law collateral 
source rule outlined earlier in this Comment,165 including the proposed 
legislation in Wisconsin,166 fly in the face of tort law’s many goals.  While 
these alternatives may lessen the risk of providing double recovery or 
phantom damages to the plaintiff, they ignore many of the core rationales 
and justifications for the rule that continue to require its existence. 
A. Overlooked Rationales of the Collateral Source Rule 
Eliminating the collateral source rule would likely result in the 
inequitable benefit of defendants.167  The alternatives not only fail to 
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prevent a defendant from receiving a windfall, they actually encourage 
such a result.  By allowing the consideration of collateral source payments 
on behalf of the plaintiff, a defendant would consistently be given a 
significant break in any judgment made against him or her when a 
collateral source payment occurred.  As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
reasoned in Leitinger v. DBart, the tortfeasor should not be given a credit 
for benefits conferred upon the victim simply because that person had the 
foresight to make wise arrangements, such as maintaining insurance.168  
Tort law has long reasoned that a benefit directed to the injured party 
should not become a windfall for the wrongdoer instead respecting the 
strategic and positive planning of the injured party.169   
This benefit, arising out of the efforts of a plaintiff, should be 
protected by contract law as well.  The plaintiff deserves to reap the 
benefit of his or her bargain by contracting with his or her insurance 
company, or whatever other outlet the plaintiff received collateral 
support from.170  “Allowing a tortfeasor to benefit from an injured party’s 
[bargain] contravenes the contract principles of promoting the parties’ 
intent and limiting third-party beneficiary rights.”171  In many ways an 
insured plaintiff is actually punished for having this foresight, as 
previously suggested.172 
Opponents of the collateral source rule often disregard the argument 
that it would result in unjust enrichment in defendants instead contending 
that potential overcompensation of a plaintiff goes against the corrective 
notions of tort law.173  These corrective notions of tort law advocate that 
damages are supposed “to return the plaintiff as closely as possible to his 
or her condition before the accident.”174  Tort law is frequently 
inconsistent on this goal, however, as exemplified by the three different 
types of damages that often make up judgments: economic, noneconomic, 
and punitive.175  While economic damages relate directly to the stated 
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“make-whole” goal of tort law, many experts argue that noneconomic 
damages (such as pain and suffering) do not relate to this goal, due in 
large part to their imprecision and airy nature.176  Additionally, punitive 
damages, which are intended for deterrence and retribution, are 
unrelated to any goal of making the plaintiff whole again.177  The 
possibility of overcompensating a plaintiff through the collateral source 
rule is no more inconsistent with the make-whole doctrine of tort law than 
awarding that same plaintiff noneconomic and punitive damages.178   
The collateral source rule, in fact, is perfectly consistent with the 
concepts of deterrence, retribution, and economic efficiency.  Ensuring 
that defendants pay the full measure of damages for tortious behavior is 
advanced by the rule, and any abrogation of it could very well result in 
under-deterrence from engaging in the tortious behavior.179  If a plaintiff’s 
insurer provided payments toward medical expenses, the plaintiff’s 
insurance would essentially serve as a subsidy for the defendant’s tortious 
behavior.180  The relationship between law and economics makes plain the 
concept that if a tortfeasor is not liable for the damages he or she causes, 
he or she will over-engage in that activity.  In fact, states with diluted 
versions of the rule have been correlated to increased vehicular deaths, 
as drivers may exhibit a slightly lower degree of care when they face less 
than the full costs of the accidents they cause, and an increase in infant 
mortality, as physicians may be exercising less care when liability for 
malpractice costs is reduced.181  Full compensation deters not only the 
injury-causing behavior by increasing the costs of it but also helps 
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individuals realize the “optimal scale of activity” that balances risk-taking 
activity with its true cost.182 
Judge Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit argues in favor of the collateral source rule out of 
overall efficiency.183  Judge Posner provides a helpful account for why law 
and economics ultimately favor the common law rule due to efficiency: 
If an accident insurance policy entitles me to receive $10,000 for a 
certain kind of accidental injury and I sustain that injury in an 
accident in which the injurer is negligent, I can both claim the 
$10,000 from the insurance company and obtain full damages 
(which, let us assume, are $10,000) from the injurer, provided I did 
not agree to assign my tort rights to the insurer (subrogation).  To 
permit the defendant to set up my insurance policy as a bar to the 
action would result in under-deterrence.  The economic cost of the 
accident, however defrayed, is $10,000, and if the judgment against 
him is zero, his incentive to spend up to $10,000 (discounted by 
the probability of occurrence) to prevent a similar accident in the 
future will be reduced.  Less obviously, the double recovery is not 
a windfall to me.  I bought the insurance policy at a price 
presumably equal to the expected cost of my injury plus the cost 
of writing the policy.  The company could if it wished have 
expected from coverage accidents in which the injurer was liable 
to me for the cost of the injury, or it could have required me to 
assign to it any legal rights that I might have arising from an 
accident.184 
A balancing of the economic factors described above—a lack of 
under-deterrence in the tortfeasor and an injured party’s investment in 
insurance—reflect the practicality behind maintaining the rule, the sense 
in which these justifications have not weakened amid a changing 
society.185  The common law collateral source rule remains a crucial rule 
of both tort and evidence law and remains a necessary doctrine in order 
to best promote the goals of Wisconsin law.  The rationales that underlie 
the rule, as well as the economic reasoning that supports it, continue to 
outweigh any of its shortcomings.  It is because of these rationales and 
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economic incentives that support Wisconsin adherence to its traditional, 
common law form and ignore any calls for its erosion or abrogation. 
B. Effect of Health Care Reform on the Collateral Source Rule 
Much has been written in recent years on the potential effect that 
recent healthcare reform may have on the future landscape of tort 
recovery and the collateral source rule.  Passage at the federal level of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010186 followed 
on the heels of legislative reforms in states such as Massachusetts, Hawaii, 
Maine, and Washington, with each policy imposing similar mechanisms 
aiming to provide healthcare coverage to all residents.187  Stated very 
generally, the ACA serves to provide all Americans with health insurance 
in two major ways.  First, by forcing the expansion of employer-based 
policies, as employers are compelled under the law to offer health 
insurance plans to individuals working full-time hours for companies 
employing fifty or more individuals.188  Second, the ACA next attempts 
to provide universal health care through a mandate that all individuals 
possess insurance coverage.189  Aside from certain exceptions, should an 
individual fail to obtain health insurance he or she will be subjected to a 
financial penalty.190 
Many believe these initiatives and reforms have the potential to 
completely undermine the core rationales of the collateral source rule—
mainly due to the fact that the rule originated at a time when few to no 
plaintiffs had health insurance,191 and these reforms rely on the ambitious 
goal of all potential plaintiffs being insured.192  One rationale of the rule 
that could be undermined is the incentive that it gives individuals to 
purchase insurance and the rewarding of a plaintiff’s foresight for doing 
so.193  Those supporting the position that healthcare reform undermines 
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the justifications of the rule would likely argue that because of the 
individual mandate in the ACA, the government provides the incentive 
to purchase insurance by imposing a financial penalty on individuals who 
fail to do so.194  Additionally, if the government compels every potential 
plaintiff to purchase health insurance or forces his or her employer to 
provide it, it may be argued that no reward for any foresight would be in 
order. 
Despite these arguments, the rationales of incentive and rewarding 
foresight still serve as adequate support to the collateral source rule in the 
face of healthcare reform.  The individual mandate requiring health 
insurance has a significant gap because Americans still have the 
individual choice of not purchasing health insurance and facing a 
relatively small penalty.195  It is far from known today just how successful 
the reform will actually be at reaching its ultimate goal of having all 
Americans covered with health insurance. The more Americans that 
choose to face the penalty in lieu of coverage, the more justified 
maintenance of the common law collateral source rule would be.  
Additionally, there are several other concerns that remain to be settled 
in regard to the ACA, such as how much job loss, if any, will result from 
the employer mandate due to employers seeking to avoid employing fifty 
full-time workers, thus sidestepping the ACA’s requirement of employers 
with fifty or more full-time workers to provide insurance to workers and 
leaving individuals to again face the choice of either obtaining coverage 
or facing the penalty.196 
The ACA and other reforms also fail to undermine the support to the 
collateral source rule that favors rewarding the contract-relationship 
between the insured and his or her insurer. Opponents of the rule reason 
that because health insurance will be compulsory, the relationship 
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between the parties takes on far less meaning.197  However, even if the 
healthcare reforms are hugely successful, this theory ultimately fails 
because it ignores an important aspect of this new healthcare landscape: 
Individuals are still able to contract for the best possible coverage or plan 
for themselves.198  Such effort on the part of the individual to find him or 
herself the best coverage available can still be rewarded under the 
collateral source rule, even in light of healthcare reform, as one form of 
insurance bargained for can certainly provide greater financial outcomes 
for a plaintiff, be it through actual coverage, lower premium payments, or 
some other result. 
Finally, the deterrence rationale remains a major justification of the 
collateral source rule because the ACA makes little effort to deter 
negligent behavior on behalf of tortfeasors.199  Eroding the collateral 
source rule reduces the defendant’s liability and allows the defendant to 
escape the full cost of harming a victim.  If everyone is insured and the 
collateral source rule is abrogated to allow only for the amount of medical 
expenses actually paid, tortfeasors would not be deterred in the slightest 
from any risk-taking behavior.  Ultimately, recent healthcare reform will 
do little to undermine the most significant rationales of the common law 
collateral source rule. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
After exploring the collateral source rule—its role, common 
criticisms, core rationales, the available alternatives, and Wisconsin’s own 
treatment of it—this Comment concludes Wisconsin was right in rejecting 
the 2013 bill and should reject any similar legislation that is again 
proposed in the coming session to ensure that the state maintain its 
adherence to the common law form of the rule.  While the primary 
criticisms about the shortcomings of the rule are valid, these negatives 
pale in comparison to the strong rationales that continue to firmly support 
the rule today.  The rationales of restoration, unjust enrichment, 
mitigation, and deterrence help to advance the greater goals of tort law 
while at the same time rewarding a plaintiff’s foresight in seeking out a 
collateral source and respecting his or her right to contract. 
An argument often put forth by the rule’s opponents is that because 
the rule came about during a time when most of the population lacked 
 
197.  Todd, supra note 11, at 983. 
198.  See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f) (2012).  The ACA does not preclude such contracting. 
199.  Todd, supra note 11, at 986. 
 238 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [99:209 
health insurance coverage, the rule is no longer necessary because a 
majority of the country now has health insurance, as well as recent 
healthcare reform.200  Because recent healthcare reform has the goal of 
universal coverage of all Americans, it is argued that the many rationales 
of the common law collateral source rule are now undermined.201  The 
changes in the healthcare landscape, however, greatly overlook the 
rationales that underlie the rule and fail to accept the reality that the 
changes in the healthcare market do little to degrade those rationales.  
They remain intact and will continue to advance the goals of tort law 
should the traditional form of the collateral source rule endure any efforts 
at tort reform in Wisconsin. 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has consistently adhered to the 
common law rule, doing so throughout many different decades and with 
many different compositions of justices on the court.  Throughout this 
entire time, the court and the state legislature have not been ignorant to 
the reforms to the collateral source rule that other jurisdictions across the 
country have enacted.  Wisconsin’s government has instead rejected any 
such change, ultimately believing that adhering to a strong form of the 
rule is what is best for the state and its citizens.  Such a position on the 
issue must resist any change in the future because, by doing so, the goals 
of Wisconsin law will continue to be advanced.  In order to best protect 
injured plaintiffs, their rights, and the many goals of the law, Wisconsin 
should continue its adherence to the common law collateral source rule. 
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